Migration of the Highly Skilled by Mechtenberg, Lydia & Strausz, Roland
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SFB 649 Discussion Paper 2009-048 
Migration of the Highly 
Skilled: Can Europe 
catch up with the US? 
  
 
Lydia Mechtenberg* 
Roland Strausz** 
 
 
* Technische Universität Berlin, Germany 
** Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany 
 
This research was supported by the Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft through the SFB 649 "Economic Risk". 
 
http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de 
ISSN 1860-5664 
 
SFB 649, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
Spandauer Straße 1, D-10178 Berlin 
S
FB
  
  
  
6
 4
 9
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
E
 C
 O
 N
 O
 M
 I 
C
  
  
 R
 I 
S
 K
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 B
 E
 R
 L
 I 
N
 
Migration of the Highly Skilled:
Can Europe catch up with the US?
Lydia Mechtenberg and Roland Strausz∗
Technical University Berlin, Humboldt Universita¨t Berlin
October 19, 2009
Abstract
We develop a model to analyze the determinants and effects of an
endogenous imperfect transferability of human capital on natives and
immigrants. The model reveals that high migration flows and high
skill-transferability are mutually interdependent. Moreover, we show
that high mobility within a Federation is necessary to attract highly
skilled immigrants into the Federation. We study in how far and in
what way the European public policy behind the Bologna and the
Lisbon Process can contribute to higher mobility in Europe.
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1 Introduction
We develop a model to analyze the determinants and effects of an imperfect
transferability of human capital on talented natives and immigrants within
a Federation. The model reveals that imperfect skill-transferability within
a Federation both induces and is induced by low mobility of the natives
in that Federation. Low mobility leads to an inferior matching between
jobs and workers and makes immigration into the Federation less attractive
especially for more talented individuals. We use the model to evaluate the
Bologna and the Lisbon Process as an effort to increase transferability within
Europe. We study in how far these measures can achieve their proclaimed
goals of reducing mismatches between jobs and skills and attracting highly
skilled immigrants in the global competition for international talent.
The paper’s contributions are as follows. We first show how imperfect
transferability of human capital limits mobility and how it affects the dis-
tribution of talents. Attributing the imperfect transferability to divergent
education systems and divergent working cultures provides us with a ratio-
nale to endogenize it: high migration flows lead to an internationalization
of workplaces and, thereby, induce a harmonization of working cultures, so
that human capital becomes more transferable across borders. On the other
hand, low migration flows result in imperfect transferability of human cap-
ital. Hence, we endogenize the degree of transferability as the outcome of
a coordination game between potential migrants. Depending on the coordi-
nation, we obtain two possible equilibria: an efficient equilibrium with high
migration and a high degree of transferability and an inefficient equilibrium
with low migration and a low degree of transferability.
We, subsequently, explain the empirically low intra–European migration
rates as the result of a coordination failure that leads to the inefficient equi-
librium. We then discuss possible approaches to increase the transferability
of human capital, starting from this inefficient equilibrium. We first argue
that public policy is able to increase transferability directly by harmonizing
education systems - a policy measure that is currently implemented coop-
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eratively in most European countries within the framework of the so-called
Bologna Process. Second, we show under which conditions such direct tar-
geting of the transferability of human capital will lead to an equilibrium with
high migration flows - and under which conditions other measures, i.e. a re-
duction of direct migration costs, must be implemented. We then identify
and compute the local welfare effects of these policies.
We further argue that imperfect transferability of human capital within
Europe constitutes a handicap in the global competition of talents. We
investigate theoretically how imperfect transferability affects migration deci-
sions of non-European young immigrants, e.g., university students, who may
choose between immigration into Europe and immigration into the U.S. Fi-
nally, we identify and compute the local welfare effects of such changes in
immigrant rates.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. The next section
puts our model and results in relation to the current European political de-
bate on migration and, in addition, relates them to the economic literature.
Section 3 develops the formal model in which we derive our results. In Sec-
tion 4 we endogenize the transferability of human capital and study how
imperfect transferability of human capital affects local migration decisions.
Section 5 analyzes the effects of imperfect transferability on global compe-
tition for international talents. We relate these results to the Bologona and
Lisbon Process in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are collected in the
Appendix.
2 Political Context and Related Literature
Before the 2004 enlargement, fears about potential detrimental effects of
labor migration within Europe were widespread among European politicians
in national governments. However, labor migration within Europe remained
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low, much lower than in regions of comparable size, like the U.S.1
This may be considered good news for opponents to migration who fear
a compression of wages in the receiving countries and a brain drain in the
sending countries. However, with low migration the potential benefits of a
better matching between skills and jobs that are expected from a unified
European labor market do not materialize. Thus, as long as Europeans are
unable or unwilling to move along with the best jobs, Europe’s productivity
will remain below its potential.2
Moreover, not only migration within Europe, but also skilled immigration
into Europe is lower than a growing number of politicians and businessmen
believe would be good for Europe’s economy.3 ”We are not good enough at
attracting highly skilled people,” the President of the European Commission,
Jose Manuel Barroso, admitted at a press conference.4 Empirical evidence for
this claim abounds. Gleis, Uebelmesser, and Werding (2008) show that the
U.S. attracts a considerably higher share of the world’s highly skilled labor
than European countries like France and Germany, or even the U.K. As
replicated in Figure 1, Boeri (2008) confirms this finding. The U.S. attracts
about twice as much immigrants with a tertiary degree than Europe (see
left panel in Figure 1). Second, immigrants in the EU score considerably
lower in all IALS tests, i.e. tests of literacy, than immigrants in New Zealand
1For empirical studies that prove labor migration within Europe to be persistently low,
see e.g. Geis, Uebelmesser, and Werding (2008) and Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008).
For an empirical comparative study showing that labor migration is considerably lower in
Europe than in the U.S., see Peri (2005) and (2007).
2Fidrmuc (2004) shows for Eastern Europe that the propensity to migrate in reaction
to asymmetric regional shocks is low. This indeed suggests (for Eastern Europe) that
matching between skills and capital is imperfect. Puhani (2001) shows empirically that it
is ”extremely unlikely” that labor mobility in Europe works as an adjustment mechanism
against asymmetric labor market shocks. Arntz (2005) shows that the unemployed in
Germany have a low propensity to migrate in regions with less tight labor markets. By
contrast, Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992) show that in the U.S., internal mobility of the
Youth is strong and mainly driven by reactions to mismatches between skills and jobs.
3See again Peri (2005) and (2007).
4Cited from Spiegel online International, Monday, September 14, 2009.
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Figure 1: International Comparisons Skilled Migrants (Source: Bouri 2008).
(see right panel in Figure 1). Third, the distribution of average IALS scores
of immigrants in a European country like Germany lies below that of the
country’s natives; whereas in Canada, immigrants and natives have the same
IALS score distribution (see lower panel in Figure 1).
The conjecture suggests itself that these two phenomena - low labor mo-
bility within Europe and low skilled immigration into Europe - are interre-
lated. If barriers to mobility are still high in Europe, a potential immigrant
must take into account her low prospects of insuring herself against asym-
metric regional shocks on the European labor market. Thus, she might prefer
migration into another region, like Canada or the U.S., where she knows that
she will be able to move along with the best jobs.
Methodically, our main contribution is to endogenize the transferability of
human capital by modeling it as an outcome of a coordination game between
potential migrants.5 Thus, the current paper is the first to bridge the gap
5To our knowledge, there are no other fully microfounded models of migration with en-
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between the literature that looks at migration as a coordination game with
complementarities and the literature that investigates the effects of imperfect
transferability of human capital. Contributions to the first-mentioned stream
of literature are, for instance, Hendricks (2001), Giannetti (2003), and Stark
(2004) who all model complementarities of the productivity of migrants sim-
ilarly. Hendricks (2001) assumes that an individual’s earnings increase in
the average level of the productivity of its ethnic group. In the model of
Giannetti (2003), an individual’s skill premium increases in the average level
of productivity of the location where he works; and Stark (2004) assumes
that an individual’s productivity increases in the average human capital of
the economy.
Complementarities between migrants are different in our framework, be-
cause we do not assume a direct effect of any individual migrant on the
productivity of the labor force in his destination country. Instead, we model
migration as a critical mass game: A sufficiently high flow of high-skilled mi-
gration can internationalize work-places in the destination country such that
human capital acquired in the source country becomes more transferable
across the border.
Our paper is further related to the literature on transferability of human
capital. This literature started with Roy’s seminal paper on the self–selection
of migrants (Roy (1951)). Borjas (1994) formalizes Roy’s ideas, while Borjas,
Bronars, and Trejo (1992) find empirical support. Subsequent work is mostly
empirical. For instance, Chiswick (1978) finds that schooling has a lower ef-
fect on earnings of immigrants and partly interprets this finding as support
for imperfect skill–transferability. Duleep and Regets (2002) also find empir-
ical support for the hypothesis of declining transferability of human capital
for immigrants in the U.S. Thus, imperfect transferability of human capital
has become an empirical fact. Yet, despite its empirical importance, little is
dogenous skill-transferability. In an important theoretical and empirical study, Duleep and
Regets (1999) endogenize skill-transferability. But the model is not fully microfounded,
and migration is not described as a coordination problem.
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known about the determinants of skill–transferability and most work treats
it as a black box. With respect to this literature, a contribution of our pa-
per is, therefore, to go beyond a straightforward comparative statics analysis
in the degree of skill–transferability and address the actual determinants of
imperfect transferability such as differences in working cultures.
3 The Model
Consider a federation that consists of two countries. In each country there
are individuals of mass one, who, in period t = 1, each enrol in higher
education at their home university. The acquired human capital from higher
education is one times the individual’s talent θ ∈ [0, 1]. The two countries
are symmetric; they do not differ in educational quality or the distribution of
talents. In particular, we assume that, in each country, talent θ is uniformly
distributed over the interval [0, 1]. We refer to individuals with a higher
education as graduates.
Apart from talent, a graduate’s productivity yi depends on the state of
the economy in the country where she works. A country has either a normal
or a booming economy. If the graduate i stays in her country of birth, and
if the economy there is normal, her productivity equals her human capital,
i.e. yi = θi. By contrast, if the graduate’s country of birth has a booming
economy, her productivity there is enhanced by a positive regional shock, i.e.
yi = θi (1 + pi), with pi ∈ (0, 1). The parameter pi ∈ (0, 1) represents the
positive economic shock and more talented graduates benefit proportionally
more from a booming economy. The assumption pi < 1 guarantees that
the graduate’s benefits from education, θi, are more important than the
productivity gain θipi < θi from favorable economic conditions. In this sense,
education is a more important determinant of productivity than a country’s
economic conditions.
Each graduate decides, in period t = 2, in which of the two countries she
wants to work. Graduates observe the countries’ economic conditions when
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they make their decision. Differences in economic conditions, therefore, drive
migration incentives. To keep our analysis tractable, we assume that exactly
one country has a booming economy, whilst the other country has a normal
economy. We denote the booming country by H and the other country by L.
Before graduates complete their education, it is, however, not known which
of the two countries will have the booming economy in period t = 2. In
particular, we assume that, in t = 1, the two countries are equally likely
to obtain a booming economy. From the perspective of period t = 1, both
countries are, therefore, fully symmetric and an individual is indifferent about
where to obtain her education.
If a graduate decides to migrate, she incurs a fixed migration cost c > 0.
This cost captures the migrant’s relocation expenses and other burdens. In
addition to the fixed costs c, a migrant also loses a part of her human capital
from education. In particular, we assume that a graduate θi who migrates
from country L to country H has a productivity θi(α+pi). The transferability
parameter α < 1 captures the idea that an education is more valuable in the
acquired than in a foreign country. This assumption captures a stylized fact
reported by a large part of the migration literature. Moreover, it seems
especially appropriate in the European context, where part of the education
is country-specific and countries differ in languages and working cultures.
The transferability parameter α plays a crucial role in our analysis. We
endogenize it in Section 4 and argue that it captures in a reduced form the
main target of the Bologna and Lisbon process. Note that when α+pi < 1, the
loss of human capital offsets any gain from migrating to a booming economy.
For this reason, we restrict attention to α + pi > 1.
We abstract from unemployment among graduates; in each country a firm
employs all the graduates on a country’s labor market so that they can always
realize their full productivity. A graduate appropriates a fixed share γ of her
productivity; the remaining part is appropriated as a positive externality
by non–academic natives of the country where the graduate works. Because
non–academics are passive, we do not model them explicitly. Yet, our welfare
8
Individuals are born
with talent θ
Individuals acquire
human capital
Economy shock
Migration decision
Production
Figure 2: The Timeline
analysis fully counts the positive externality from a graduate on the non–
academics in the country where the graduate works.
Figure 2 describes the sequence of events. First, talented individuals
are born and their individual talents realized. Second, individuals study in
their native country and acquire their human capital from higher education.
Third, nature determines which country has the better economy. Fourth,
graduates decide whether or not to expend a cost c and lose a share (1− α)
of their higher education to migrate into the neighboring country. Finally,
graduates work and the productivity of a given graduate is shared between
herself and the non–academics in the country in which she works.
4 Intra–Federal Mobility
We first focus on intra–federal mobility and study the migration decision of
the natives in the countries H and L. First consider a graduate with talent
θi from country H . She obtains a payoff γθi(1+pi) if she remains in country
H and obtains the payoff γθiα − c if she migrates to country L. Hence, a
graduate from the high productivity country has no incentive to migrate and,
therefore, there is no migration from H to L.
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In contrast, a graduate i from country L obtains the payoff γθi if she
remains in L, whereas migrating to country H yields her a payoff γθi(α +
pi) − c. Hence, a graduate from country L with talent θi migrates exactly
when6
θi ≥ θˆ(α) ≡ min
{
c
γ [pi − (1− α)]
, 1
}
.
Let α¯ ≡ 1− pi + c/γ so that θˆ(α) is smaller than 1 only if α > α¯. Then,
we obtain the following result:
Lemma 1 For α ≤ α, no migration occurs. For α > α, only graduates with
talent θi ∈ [θˆ(α), 1] migrate from L into H.
The comparative statics are intuitive: The flow of migration increases in
the bargaining power of the labor force, γ, in the size of the economic shock pi,
and decreases with the direct costs of migration, c. Because c is independent
of talent, it is the highly talented graduates who migrate, whereas the less
talented graduates remain in their home country.
Moreover, Lemma 1 reveals two effects of the imperfect transferability
of human capital α < 1. First, there is less migration than in a situation
in which human capital is fully transferable across borders: θˆ(α) < θˆ(1).
Consequently, the overall surplus generated on the labor market of the fed-
eration is lower with α < 1 than it would have been with α = 1. The reason
is that, for α < 1, the matching of jobs to graduates is inefficient. Second,
low transferability α amplifies the effect that migrants are the more talented
graduates.7
6By assumption pi + α > 1
7As Chiswick (2000) points out, favorable self-selection of migrants occurs in any model
in which (1) there are out-of-pocket costs of migration, and (2) earnings (in any country)
increase in ability.
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4.1 Coordinating Migration
The proportional loss of human capital associated with migration, (1− α),
represents an inefficiency from the diversity in national education systems,
working cultures, and languages within Europe. The literature hitherto
treats this loss as exogenous. By contrast, we extend our model so as to
view the transferability parameter α as a policy variable that is endogenous
in two ways. First, it depends on the comparability and the universal cur-
riculum of higher education systems. Second and probably more importantly,
the parameter depends on the diversity in working cultures and languages
spoken on the job. These differences become smaller when the workforce be-
comes more internationalized. The underlying idea is that firms adapt their
working culture to highly skilled migrants if they come in large numbers. For
instance, it may become unnecessary for a highly skilled migrant to learn the
native language of her destination country before realizing her full potential
at work, since the firm where she starts working might switch to English as
a focal language when its labor force becomes more international.
Due to this effect, mobility and the degree of transferability are interde-
pendent and self–enforcing: The more graduates ignore national borders and
move along with the more productive jobs, the more firms and workers find
it attractive to harmonize working cultures and switch to a common inter-
national language. This then facilitates migration between these countries,
because human capital will become more easily transferable across borders.
Hence, internationalization increases with migration, which, in its turn, in-
creases with internationalization.
We model the outcome from this self–enforcing process as follows. Let
m denote the share of European migrants from the low productivity country
L to the high productivity country H . We assume that if m is larger than
some cut-off value m¯ ∈ (0, 1), then a harmonization of working cultures
and languages in countries 1 and 2 occurs. We take the extreme that, if
m ≥ m¯, diversity between working cultures and languages spoken on the
job disappears completely so that human capital becomes fully transferable
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across borders. Formally,
α(m) =
{
1 if m ≥ m¯
α0 if m < m¯.
(1)
Consequently, migration becomes a coordination game between gradu-
ates. In order to investigate the outcomes of the coordination game, define
αˆ ≡
c
γ (1− m¯)
+ 1− pi.
We have αˆ ∈ (α, 1) exactly when m¯ < 1 − c/(γpi). Moreover, let m∗ and
α∗ denote the equilibrium share of migrants and the equilibrium share of
post-migration human capital, respectively. The following proposition char-
acterizes the equilibrium outcomes of the coordination game.
Proposition 1 i) For αˆ > 1, the equilibrium outcome m∗ is unique. In
particular, α∗ = α0, and m
∗ = 0 if α0 ≤ α¯ and m
∗ = 1 − c/[γ(α0 + pi − 1)]
if α0 > α¯. ii) For αˆ ≤ 1 and α0 ≤ α¯, there exists an equilibrium outcome
m∗ = 1 − c/(γpi) > m¯ and α∗ = 1, and an additional equilibrium outcome
m∗ = 0 and α∗ = α0. iii) For αˆ ≤ 1 and α0 > α¯, there exists an equilibrium
outcome m∗ = 1 − c/(γpi) > m¯ and α∗ = 1 and, for α0 < αˆ, an additional
equilibrium outcome m∗ = 1− c/[γ(α0 + pi − 1)] and α
∗ = α0.
Figure 3 illustrates the different equilibria and their relation to the trans-
ferability variable α for the two cases αˆ > 1 and αˆ ≤ 1. For a thorough
understanding of how the intensity of (anticipated) international migration
and the transferability of human capital across borders influence each other,
it is helpful to investigate in more detail the qualitative differences between
the multiple migration equilibria.
First observe that the outcomes can be ordered according to the Pareto-
criterion. The high–migration equilibrium m∗ = 1− c/ (γpi) > m¯ and α∗ = 1
is Pareto dominant, because it allows for migration without any loss of human
12
αˆ > 1 : α
0 α¯ 1
m = 0 0 < m < m¯
αˆ ≤ 1 : α
0 α¯ αˆ 1
m = 0 0 < m < m¯
m > m¯
Figure 3: Mobility equilibria
capital. In the high–migration equilibrium, graduates expect migration to be
intensive enough to harmonize working cultures and to raise the transferabil-
ity of human capital α to 1. Accordingly, graduates expect no loss of their
human capital from migration into the better economy, thereby, collectively
rationalizing their expectations.
When graduates have pessimistic expectations, low–migration equilibria
obtain that are Pareto inferior. Such expectations can even lead to the total
absence of migration. If graduates expect that not enough of their fellow–
graduates migrate into the better economy and that, therefore, working cul-
ture in the country with the better economy will not be international, they
anticipate a loss of human capital (1− α0) from migration. With such a loss,
the less talented graduates prefer to stay in their home country, thereby, jus-
tifying the initial expectation that not enough graduates migrate. This coor-
dination failure may explain the empirically consistently low intra–European
migration rates as compared to the US. They indicate that Europe is trapped
in an inefficient low–migration equilibrium.
In a low–migration equilibrium, both the intensity of migration and the
human capital that migrants lose depend on the magnitude of α0. The higher
α0, the more human capital can be transferred across borders, and the more
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intensive migration becomes. Consequently, the migration equilibria with
α∗ = α0 can be ranked according to the magnitude of α0. The equilibria
with higher α∗ = α0 Pareto–dominate the others.
The parameter α0 represents two things. First, a high α0 stands for low
diversity in national working cultures and languages spoken on the job. For
instance, a German graduate finds it easier to realize the full potential of
her acquired human capital in Austria than in France. Second, α0 repre-
sents the degree to which a given national higher education system provides
human capital that is transferable into the labor market of the other coun-
try. For instance, a diploma as provided from German universities before the
implementation of the Bologna Process was unknown to employers in other
European countries, and graduates with a diploma have not been appreci-
ated much in European countries other than Germany. Thus, prior to the
Bologna Process, migration of a small number of graduates from Germany
to, for instance, England was characterized by a low α0. Consequently, α0
rises, when, in line with the Bologna process, Europe harmonizes university
degrees.8
4.2 Welfare Effect of Migrants
In this subsection we identify the different welfare effects of raising the trans-
ferability of human capital from α0 to 1. We show that the social welfare of
country H and the federation as a whole increases, while the effect on the
welfare of country L is ambiguous.
First consider the welfare in the booming country H . Because the natives
of the booming country do not migrate, each talent θ ∈ [0, 1] contributes
θ(1 + pi) to their country’s welfare. In addition, country H captures a share
1 − γ from the migrants with talent θ ∈ (θˆ(α0), 1] from country L. Overall
8In Section 6, we will explicitly address the Bologna Process as a political attempt to
increase intra-European migration.
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welfare in country H is, therefore,
WH(α∗) =
∫ 1
0
θ (1 + pi) dθ +
∫ 1
θ̂(α∗)
(1− γ) θ (α∗ + pi) dθ. (2)
A low transferability of human capital reduces the accumulated positive
externalities produced by migrants on country H . We may use expression
(2) to compute the welfare gain from raising the transferability from α0 to 1:
∆WHm = W
H(1)−WH(α0)
= (1− γ)
[∫ θ̂(α1)
θ̂(1)
θ (1 + pi) dθ +
∫ 1
θ̂(α1)
θ (1− α1) dθ
]
> 0. (3)
The sign of expression (3) is unambiguously positive; country H gains when
the transferability of human capital becomes perfect. The two integrals in
(3) reveal a welfare gain from two different sources. First, imperfect trans-
ferability of human capital keeps medium talented migrants born in country
L away from the labor market in H . It leads to an inefficient matching of
graduates and jobs. The first integral in (3) represents the gain in improv-
ing the matching when the transferability of human capital becomes perfect.
Second, highly talented migrants from country L, who migrate regardless
of the migration inefficiency 1 − α0, are more productive in H without the
migration inefficiency. The second integral in (3) expresses this welfare gain.
Next consider the welfare effects on country L. After finishing their ed-
ucation, only the graduates with talents below θˆ(α∗) remain in L. These
immobile graduates contribute their full productivity to country L’s welfare.
The more talented graduates θ > θˆ(α∗) migrate into country H , and these
mobile graduates contribute only a fraction γ of their productivity to the
country’s social welfare. Country L’s welfare is therefore
WLm(α
∗) =
∫ θ̂(α∗)
0
θdθ +
∫ 1
θ̂(α∗)
(γθ(α∗ + pi)− c)dθ. (4)
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It follows that an increase in the transferability of human capital from α0
to 1 increases country L’s welfare by
∆WLm = W
L
m(1)−W
L
m(α0)
= −
∫ θ̂(α0)
θ̂(1)
(1− γ)θdθ +
∫ θ̂(α0)
θ̂(1)
(γθpi − c)dθ +
∫ 1
θ̂(α0)
γθ(1− α0)dθ.(5)
Expression (5) shows that an elimination of the inefficiencies in the trans-
ferability of human capital has positive and negative effects on country L.
Its sign is therefore ambiguous. The first integral in the expression demon-
strates the negative effect that a higher transferability increases the outflow
of graduates from country L. Because the country loses a share 1− γ of the
productivity of migrants, this impacts country L’s welfare negatively. Yet,
graduates migrate because it raises their personal welfare and this has a pos-
itive effect on country L’s social welfare. The second integral captures the
change in personal welfare of graduates who become mobile when the trans-
ferability of human capital is 1 rather than α0. Finally, the third integral
captures the change in welfare from those graduates who migrate regardless
of the imperfect transferability; their utility is larger with perfect transfer-
ability and this benefits country L.
Considering the overall welfare effects confirms the intuition that an elim-
ination of the migration inefficiency raises overall welfare in Federation 1:
∆W 1 = ∆WHm +∆W
L
m =
∫ θˆ(α0)
θˆ(1)
(θpi − c)dθ +
∫ 1
θˆ(α0)
θ(1− α0)dθ < 0.
The expression is unambiguously positive, because θpi > γθpi > c for all
θ ∈ (θˆ(α0), θˆ(1)). The first integral represents the federation’s welfare gain
from a better matching of jobs and graduates. The second integral represents
the welfare gain from mobile graduates, who, with perfect transferability, do
no longer have their human capital diminished.
Given that the two countries are symmetric ex ante, they both expect
a positive gain from high mobility and, therefore, have a strict incentive in
period 1 to eliminate any migration inefficiency.
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5 Global Competition for Talent
Empirically, not only migration of highly skilled within Europe is low as
compared with the US, but also immigration of highly skilled into Europe.
Because of shrinking populations and increased globalized competition, Eu-
ropean politicians increasingly speak out in favor of highly skilled immigra-
tion.9 The Bologna and the Lisbon Process are build on this opinion and aim
at making Europe more attractive for talents from non–European countries.
In this section we investigate the idea that the low intra– and inter–
European migration rates are interrelated, because low transferability of hu-
man capital deters inter–European migration. The reasoning is straightfor-
ward: If it is more costly to transfer acquired human capital within Europe
than within the US, then insurance against locally unfavorable economic con-
ditions is more costly in Europe. This translates into a preference for the US
and leads to low rates of inter–European migration.10
We extend our model to study immigration from a third part of the world,
e.g. Asia, into two federations, Federation 1 and Federation 2. Federation 1
represents Europe and Federation 2 represents the US. In order to focus on
the above argument, we assume that Federation 2 is identical to Federation
1 except that in Federation 2, human capital is fully transferable across
borders.
9See, for instance, page 45 of Kok (2003), the 2003 report of the European Employment
Taskforce. There, the following policy suggestion is made: ”Labour migration has to be
managed more effectively if it is to be an effective response to labour market needs and
in order to achieve better integration. While priority must be given to using the existing
labour reserves in the EU, carefully managed immigration could help prevent imbalances
in the European labour force, both in terms of age and of skills structure.”
10European Politicians seem to be aware of this. For instance, Kok (2003) suggests:
”The procedures for admission of workers from third countries should be made simpler,
quicker and more transparent. Mobility from one Member State to another by third
country nationals already legally present in one Member State should also be facilitated.”
These are not completely empty words: In 2009, the European Parliament has decided to
introduce the Blue Card which will legally allow immigrants to work and migrate within
the European Union as long as they stay employed.
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In particular, each federation consists of two countries, each with mass 1
of individuals with talent θ uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. The individual θi
first studies at a university in her home country and, thereby, acquires human
capital θi. After observing the economic conditions, she then has to decide
where to work and realize her human capital. As in Federation 1, exactly one
country in Federation 2 has a positive economic shock pi > 0, whereas the
other country in Federation 2 does not. Each country is equally likely to have
the booming economy. There is no unemployment among graduates; a firm in
each of the two countries enables each graduate to realize her productivity. A
graduate appropriates the same share γ of this productivity as in Federation
1, while the remaining part accrues to the country where the individual works.
When a graduate migrates within Federation 2, she incurs a fixed cost c > 0.
The only, but crucial difference between Federation 1 and 2 is that when a
graduate migrates she does not lose any human capital: α1 ≤ α2 ≡ 1.
Let H2 denote the country in Federation 2 with the highly productive
economy and L2 the country with the worse economy. Then, a graduate i
from H2 earns γθi(1 + pi) in her home country H2 and γθi − c in the other
country L2. Consequently, all natives from H2 remain in their home country,
where their productivity is higher. In contrast, a graduate i from L2 earns
γθi(1+pi)−c in country H2 and γθi in her home country L2. Hence, migration
into H2 is beneficial to i if and only if
γθipi > c.
We assume that the cost of migration is low enough, c < γpi, so that there
always exist some highly talented individuals from L2 for whom migration is
profitable. In particular, individuals from country L2 migrate into country
H2 exactly when
θi > θˆ(1) =
c
γpi
.
Now consider immigrants from some third country C. Because we fo-
cus on student immigration, we assume that no university is stationed in
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C. Therefore, individuals in C must obtain their human capital either in
Federation 1 or Federation 2. Empirically, a large share of graduates from
developing countries who obtained their degree in Europe or the US remain in
the developed part of the world. Accordingly, we assume that immigrants do
not return to country C but stay in the federation where they acquired their
human capital. Hence, we also abstract from migration between federations.
Immigrants from C differ in two dimensions. First, just as the citizens
of the two federations they differ in talent θ ∈ [0, 1]. Second, immigrants
differ in their subjective preferences for a specific federation. In particular,
let δ ∈ [−1, 1] express the additional utility that an immigrant obtains from
migrating to Federation 1 rather than Federation 2. Hence, if δi > 0, then a
specific immigrant i has, all other things equal, a preference for Federation
1. For δi < 0, immigrant i has a preference for Federation 2. We assume
that (θ, δ) are uniformly distributed over the rectangle [0, 1] × [−1, 1] with
mass µ.
5.1 Immigration Decisions
An immigrant who, after selecting Federation 1, happens to end up in the
country with the worse economy will migrate if and only if her talent θ exceeds
θˆ(α1). Thus, an immigrant with θ ≥ θˆ(α1) always ends up working in the
high productive country, either because she was lucky to pick the booming
country from the start or because she, after finishing her education, moved
to the highly productive country. From an ex ante perspective, these two
possibilities are equally likely and, therefore, the mobile immigrant expects
a payoff from moving to Federation 1 of
V mi1 = γθ(1 + pi)/2 + (γθ(α1 + pi)− c)/2 + δi.
By contrast, an immigrant θ ≤ θˆ(α1) who has selected Federation 1 finds
that migration into the neighboring country is unattractive. This immobile
immigrant, therefore, is equally likely to end up working in country L or H .
Hence, an immobile immigrant i expects a payoff from moving to Federation
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1 of
V ii1 = γθ(1 + pi)/2 + γθ/2 + δi.
Instead, an immigrant who decides to immigrate to Federation 2, ends
up working in the highly productive country whenever her talent exceeds
θˆ(1). Therefore, this mobile immigrant expects a payoff from immigrating
into Federation 2 of
V mi2 = γθ(1 + pi)/2 + (γθ(1 + pi)− c)/2.
By contrast, an immigrant with a talent of only θ < θˆ(1) remains immo-
bile in Federation 2 and, therefore, expects a payoff from moving to Federa-
tion 2 of
V ii2 = γθ(1 + pi)/2 + γθ/2.
Comparing the payoffs for the different types of immigrants, we obtain
the following result.
Proposition 2 An immigrant with characteristics (θ, δ) decides to move to
Federation 1 if i) θ ∈ [0, θˆ (α1)] and δ > 0, or if ii) θ ∈ (θˆ(1), θˆ(α1)] and
δ > (γθpi − c)/2, or if iii) θ ∈ (θˆ(α1), 1] and δ > γθ (1− α1) /2.
Figure 4 illustrates the Proposition’s results. Immigrants with δ > 0 have
an inherent preference for Federation 1, whereas immigrants with δ < 0 have
a preference for Federation 2. The proposition shows that immigrants with
low skills θ ≤ θˆ(1) decide in line with their inherent preferences. The reason
is that, independent of the federation they live in, these immigrants are
immobile after their graduation. Therefore, the difference in transferability
of human capital between the two federations does not play a role.
In contrast, the difference in transferability of human capital affect immi-
gration decisions for immigrants with an intermediate talent θ ∈ (θˆ(1), θˆ(α1)].
These immigrants are mobile within Federation 2, but are immobile within
Federation 1 when the transferability of human capital is α1 < 1. For these
immigrants, Federation 2 has therefore an advantage over Federation 1. As
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Figure 4: Decision of immigrants
illustrated by area II in Figure 4, this advantage may outweigh an inherent
preference for Federation 1.
Finally, immigrants with a high talent θ ∈ (θˆ(α0), 1] are mobile both
in Federation 1 and 2, despite a limited transferability of human capital in
Federation 1. These highly talented immigrants regard the low transferability
α1 as a disadvantage of Federation 1 that skews their preference towards
Federation 2. Thus, the more talented they are, the less of them move to
Federation 1. Area IV illustrates these types of immigrants.
Figure 4 confirms the idea that due to low transferability of human capital
within Federation 1, Federation 1 has less immigrants than Federation 2.
Yet, the proposition also reveals that the loss of graduates affects the talent
composition in the Federation. Federation 1 loses out on the most talented
graduates. If one accepts the assumption that Europe is better represented
by Federation 1 and the U.S. by Federation 2, then this result is in accordance
with the empirical facts.
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5.2 Welfare Effects of Immigrants
Figure 4 is helpful in guiding our computations concerning the welfare effects
of an imperfect transferability of human capital. It shows that we may distin-
guish four different types of immigrants whom the transferability inefficiency
α1 < 1 affects differently.
First, Area I represents the immigrants who decide in favor of Federation
1 despite a low transferability but decide against migrating to country H if
they happen to end up in country L. With a perfect transferability of human
capital, these immigrants would migrate within the federation and, thereby,
raise their productivity by a factor pi. Because the federation appropriates a
share of 1− γ of their productivity, an immigrant in Area I of type θi raises
the federation’s social welfare by
∆EI(θi) = (1− γ)θipi.
The relative proportion of immigrants of type θi in Area I is
MI(θi) =
∫ 1
(γθipi−c)/2
1/4dδ = (2− γθipi + c) /8.
so that the welfare effect over Area I is
∆WI =
∫ θˆ(α1)
θˆ(1)
MI(θ)∆EI(θ)dθ.
Area II represents those immigrants who, due to the reduced transferabil-
ity, move to Federation 2 rather than Federation 1. With a perfect transfer-
ability of human capital, these immigrants move to Federation 1 and all end
up working in country H . Consequently, an immigrant in Area II of type θi
raises the federation’s social welfare by
∆EII(θi) = (1− γ)θi(1 + pi).
The relative proportion of immigrants of type θi in Area II is
MII(θi) =
∫ (γθipi−c)/2
0
1/2dδ = (γθipi − c)/4
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so that the welfare effect over Area II is
∆WII =
∫ θˆ(α1)
θˆ(1)
MII(θ)∆EII(θ)dθ.
Area III represents those immigrants who decide to move to Federation
1. If these immigrants are unlucky and happen to end up in country L,
they, subsequently, migrate to country H . An efficient transferability of
human capital, therefore, raises the productivity of these immigrants by a
factor (1 − α1). As a result, an immigrant in Area III of type θi raises the
federation’s social welfare by
∆EIII(θi) = (1− γ)θi(1− α1).
The relative proportion of immigrants of type θi in Area III is
MIII(θi) =
∫ 1
γθi(1−α1)/2
1/2dδ = (2− γθi(1− α1))/4
so that the welfare effect over Area III is
∆WIII =
∫ 1
θˆ(α1)
MIII(θ)∆EIII(θ)dθ.
Area IV represents those immigrants who, due to the migration ineffi-
ciency in Federation 1, decide to move to Federation 2. Without the ineffi-
ciency, they choose Federation 1 and, either by luck or subsequent migration,
end up working in country H . An immigrant in Area IV of type θi raises the
federation’s social welfare by
∆EIV (θi) = (1− γ)θi(1 + pi).
The relative proportion of immigrants of type θi in Area IV is
MIV (θi) =
∫ γθi(1−α1)/2
0
1/2dδ = γθi(1− α1)/4
so that the welfare effect over Area IV is
∆WIV =
∫ 1
θˆ(α1)
MIV (θ)∆EIV (θ)dθ.
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The overall welfare effects of immigrants on Federation 1 are
∆W 1 = µ(∆WI +∆WII +∆WIII +∆WIV ) > 0, (6)
where µ is the mass of immigrants. It is unambiguously positive, because
each ∆E is positive.
6 The Bologna and the Lisbon Process
The Bologna and the Lisbon Process are coordinated political attempts to
increase mobility in Europe. The declared aims of these measures are to
reduce mismatches between jobs and talents and to attract highly skilled
immigrants. These two aims are meant to boost productivity in Europe and
allow Europe to attain its full potential.
In our model, mobility in Federation 1 can be raised by two different
approaches, given that the graduates themselves fail to coordinate on the
high migration equilibrium. First, transferability of human capital, α0, could
be enhanced. Second, migration costs c could be lowered for migrants.
The Bologna Process is best understood as an attempt to increase trans-
ferability of human capital α0 by reducing the diversity of higher education
systems. In a harmonized education system firms are better able to judge the
value of a foreign university degree, which increases the quality of matching
between jobs and graduates.11
The Lisbon Process should be understood in a wider sense. It encom-
passes all measures that increase labor mobility and immigration of students
11Accordingly, the official Bologna Website 2007-2010 says: ”The purpose of recognition
is to make it possible for learners to use their qualifications from one education system in
another education system (or country) without losing the real value of those qualifications.
The main international legal text that aims to further the fair recog-
nition of qualifications is the Council of Europe/UNESCO Conven-
tion on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Educa-
tion in the European Region (Lisbon Recognition Convention).” See
http://www.ond.vlaanderen.be/hogeronderwijs/bologna/ActionLines/recognition.htm
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and workers whose skills are needed in Europe. Accordingly, the European
Commission suggests both policies that make human capital more transfer-
able and policies that reduce other migration costs. For instance, in a 2008
report, it says: ”The Commission recommends that Member States develop
integration and social inclusion policies for mobile workers and their fami-
lies, using existing EU measures and tools, e.g. on cultural, linguistic and
schooling policies and on anti-discrimination and skills recognition.”12 Thus,
in the present context, the Lisbon Process can be understood as a bundle of
soft policy measures that contribute to both increasing α0 and decreasing c.
However, as can be seen from Figure 3, targeting α0 makes sense only if
α̂ < 1. This is because only then, the high-migration equilibrium exists at
all. Thus, only for α̂ < 1 the high-migration equilibrium can be made unique
by increasing α0 above α̂. If, by contrast, the starting point of policy is a
low-migration equilibrium with α̂ > 1, the only possibility of reaching the
high-migration equilibrium is to lower c until α̂ < 1. Intuitively, if migration
costs c outweigh the effect of the positive shock on income, γpi, then it is not
sufficient to target the transferability of human capital. Instead, one first
has to enhance the relative importance of the positive economic shock by
lowering direct migration costs.
A policy of increasing α0 can have two alternative effects. On the one
hand, it can contribute to increasing migration in a low migration equilib-
rium, without being sufficient to establish the high migration equilibrium.
This happens as long as, for given c, α0 remains below α̂.By contrast, if the
policies implemented in the course of the Bologna and the Lisbon Process are
sufficient to establish α0 above α̂, then they will induce the high migration
equilibrium.
Finally, an important practical consideration is that the Bologna and
the Lisbon Process are both voluntary, cooperative policies. Participating
countries must, therefore, each have an individual incentive to implement
the respective policies, i.e., each of the countries has to expect an increase in
12See page 14 of COM (2008).
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welfare from supporting the Bologna and the Lisbon Process. Our analysis
shows that this is guaranteed only ex ante, i.e., prior to the realization of
the economic shock. This is so because only the overall expected change in
welfare from switching to the high migration equilibrium is unambiguously
positive for both of the countries.
This observation suggests a stronger support for long term policies than
short term ones. Hence, reforms targeted at the education system might
be easier to implement cooperatively than reforms that affect current labor
mobility. In the context of our model, this means that increasing α0 can be
achieved cooperatively, whereas it is more difficult to agree about decreasing
c by, for example, directly subsidizing migration.
7 Conclusion
We show that low transferability of human capital thwarts internal migration
of talented graduates. This leads to two types of inefficiencies: First, an inef-
ficient matching of graduates and jobs occurs and, as a result, graduates do
not attain their full productive potential. Second, low transferability creates
a handicap in the global competition for international talents. Interpreting
the Lisbon and Bologna Process as means to increase the transferability of
human capital, we show how they may help to increase mobility and make
Europe a more attractive destination for especially the more talented indi-
viduals.
In order to focus on the imperfect transferability of human capital, we
considered a highly stylized model of migration. In particular, we assumed
that all countries and federations are symmetric except for the transferability
of human capital. This abstraction allows us to identify clearly the effects
of imperfect transferability. Clearly, countries and federations do not only
differ in the transferability of human capital but also in many other dimen-
sions. Indeed, popular debate attributes differences in (im)migration rates
of higher educated between Europe and the US to higher educational quality
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and higher wages in the US. From this perspective, our contribution is to
point to a third possible cause: less transferable human capital between the
countries within Europe than between the states in the US.
8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Follows directly from the body text. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: We first determine the conditions under which
the different equilibrium outcomes m∗ ∈ [0, 1] exist:
i) An equilibrium with m∗ = 0 and α∗ = α0 exists exactly when for α
∗ =
α0, the highest talented graduate θi = 1 has no strict incentive to migrate.
Thus, m∗ = 0 and α∗ = α0 exactly when γ ≥ γ(α0 + pi)− c, i.e. if and only
if α0 ≤ α¯.
ii) An equilibrium with m∗ ∈ (0, m¯) and α∗ = α0 exists exactly when
the graduate with talent θi = 1 −m
∗ is, with α∗ = α0, indifferent between
migrating or not. This is because then, all θ > 1−m∗ have a strict incentive to
migrate and all θ < 1−m∗ have a strict incentive not to migrate. Indifference
of type θ = 1−m∗ obtains exactly when γ(1−m∗) equals γ(1−m∗)(α0+pi)−c,
which is equivalent to
m∗ = 1−
c
γ(α0 + pi − 1)
.
Hence, the equilibrium exists exactly when 1− c
γ(α0+pi−1)
is larger than zero
and smaller than m¯, which is equivalent to α0 ∈ (α¯, αˆ).
iii) An equilibrium with m∗ ∈ (m¯, 1) and α∗ = 1 exists exactly when the
graduate with talent θi = 1−m
∗ is, for α∗ = 1, indifferent between migrating
or not. For α∗ = 1, indifference of type θ = 1 − m∗ obtains exactly when
γ(1−m∗) equals γ(1−m∗)(1+pi)−c, which is equivalent tom∗ = 1−c/(γpi)).
Because 1−c/(γpi) > m¯ is equivalent to αˆ < 1, this equilibrium exists exactly
when αˆ < 1.
iv) An equilibrium with m∗ = 1 exists only if the graduate with talent
θi = 0 has, with α
∗ = 1, a weak incentive to migrate. But this requires
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c ≤ 0, which is a contradiction to the assumptions of the model. Therefore,
an equilibrium with m∗ = 1 does not exist. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Note that θˆ(1) ≤ θˆ(α1) for any α1 ∈ [0, 1].
We therefore have three types of immigrants to consider:
i) An immigrant with talent θ ∈ [0, θˆ(1)] expects a payoff V ii1 from moving
to Federation 1 and V ii2 from moving federation to 2. She, therefore, decides
in favor of Federation 1 exactly when V ii1 ≥ V
ii
2 . Thus, she moves into
Federation 1 if and only if δ ≥ 0.
ii) An immigrant with talent θ ∈ (θˆ(1), θˆ(α1)] expects a payoff V
ii
1 from
moving into Federation 1 and a payoff V mi2 from moving into Federation 2.
She, therefore, decides in favor of Federation 1 exactly when V ii1 ≥ V
mi
2 , i.e.
if and only if δ > (γθpi − c)/2.
iii) An immigrant with talent θ ∈ (θˆ(α1), 1] expects a payoff V
mi
1 from
moving to Federation 1 and V mi2 from moving to Federation 2. Thus, she
decides in favor of Federation 1 exactly when V mi1 ≥ V
mi
2 , i.e. if and only if
δ > γθ (1− α1) /2. This third case is relevant if and only if θˆ(α1) < 1, that
is, if and only if α1 > c/γ − pi + 1. Q.E.D.
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